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THE IMPACT OF  THE AGENCIES ON 
CONVENTIONAL FIXED-RATE MORTGAGE  YIELDS 
ABSTRACT 
Between the early l980s  and 1986, the share of new conforming  (under 
$153,000 in 1986) conventional fixed—rate  mortgages  (FRM5(  that went into 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage  pools increased from  under 5 percent  to 
over  50  percent.  The impact of these agencies movi.ng from  negligible 
participants  to  dominant players in  this market  is investigated in this study 
by an analysis of  yields on 4,900 loans closed in  California  during May-June 
1978 and 1,800 closed inMay—June 1986. 
Our analysis  indicates that the loan rate depends on the loan-to-value 
ratio, the loan size, and, in 1986, whether the loan is far above,  just above, 
or  below the conforming  loan  limit.  Rates on loans far above the conforming 
loan limit exceed  those on otherwise comparable  loans below the limit by 30 
basis points and those on  loans destined to  exceed  the limit within  a year  by 
15 basis points.  That  is, the expanded  agency securitization of conforming 
FRMs has significantly  lowered the rates on both  conforming  loans and loans 
somewhat above  the conforming  limit  (27 percent of  nonconforming  loans  in 
1986)  relative  to what  they  would otherwise  have been. 
The effects of  a 30 basis point  lower FRM rate are many:  households  are 
more  likely  to choose FRMs than ARMs, to  decide to  own rather than rent, and 
to own larger  houses.  Moreover,  traditional mortgage portfolio  lenders will 
have fewer ARMs  to  purchase  and will earn lower returns on  FRM investments.  A 
few sample  calculations are provided to illustrate the possble magnitudes  of 
these effects 
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Tha fedaral agencies' role in the conventional fixed-rate mortgage market 
has expanded sherply in the 1980s.  FNMA purchased some conventional mortgages 
in the 1970s, but at the end of the decade  its portfolio of conventional 
single—family mortgages was still under $20 billion.  Also, while FHLMC's 
pass-through program existed in the 1970s, the outstanding  level of  its pass— 
throughswas also still under $20 billion at the end of the decade.  In 
contrast, FNMA initiated its pass-through program in  1g82 and issues for both 
of  the agencies exploded, rising to  nearly $150 billion per  in  1986—87. 
The best measure of  the agencies' expanded role is the increase in the 
percentage of "new" conventional fixed-rate loans  (generally defined as less 
than one year since origination) eligible for secoritization that are, in  fact, 
securitized by FHLMC and FNMA.  Column 8 in Table 1  shows that the percentage 
of  new conventional FRMs secoritized by  these agencies has increased from  3 to 
40 percent in  the l98Ds.  Moreover, about a quarter of  FRMs, the so-called 
jumbo loans, cannot be secoritized by the agencies becaose the size of  these 
loans exceeds the conforming  loan limit.  Dividing column 8 by  0.75, the share 
of  new conforming FRNs securitized in recent years is thus seen  (column 9)  to 
be in  excess of 50 percent.  That is,  in five years the agencies have gone  from 
a negligible participant to  the dominant player in  the market for conforming 
FRMs. 
The principal hypothesis tested in this paper is  that the recent 
dominance of the conforming FRN market by  the agencies has reduced new issoe 
yields on  conforming loans relative to  those on jumbo loans.  The test consists 
of an  analysis and comparison of yields on samples of  conventional FRMs closed —2— 
in California  in May—June of  1978  (4,750)  loana)  and 1986  (1,875 loans), 
periods before and after the agency dominance.  Concentrating on one state 
allows os to ignore many  regional effects, such as variations  in state 
foreclosure laws, on yields.  Moreover, California accounts for a substantial 
frsction of  the dollar volume of  all FRMs closed,  27 percent in 1986, and of 
jumbo FRMs closed, 53 percent in  1986. 
We  begin with a discussion  of  the data  examined, report some empirical 
estimates, and close by summarizing the results and drawing some implications 
of the results.  We  find that the increased securitization of  the conventional 
fixed—rate market has lowered yields on  conforming loans by  about 30 basis 
points relative to  those on large jumbo loans and yields on  small jumbos  (soon 
to be  conforming) by about 15  basis points. 
I.  The Closed Loan Data 
Each month since 1963, the FMLBB has conducted a survey of conventional 
loans closed  (loans "approved", prior to  1973) during the first five days  of 
the month.  The loans are on  single—family non—farm residential properties, 
both newly built and previously occupied.  The loans are permanent, fully 
amortizing, first mortgages on properties transferred.  Thus refinancings, 
second mortgages, and interim financing are excluded, although a small number 
of combination constructiun-purchaae  loans are included.  The loans are those 
made by  all major lenders  (originators)  savings and loans, mutual  aavings 
banks, commercial banks, and mortgage bankers.  The loans have both  fixed and 
adjustable rates. 
The survey provides the contract interest rate, initial fees and charges, 
the term  to  maturity, the mortgage loan amount, and the purchase price of the 
property.  The effective interest rate  is officially calculated  in the survey 
as the contract rate plus  the initial fees and charges amortized over  ten —3— 
years; the loan—to-value ratio is the loan amount divided by  purchase price. 
Since 1986, the base note rate (contract rate less temporary buydowns or 
discounts) for all loans and the interest rate adjustment-period and life-of— 
loan rate caps for ARMs have  been reported. 
The interest rate survey data are easily subdivided into conforming and 
jumbo loan categories.  The maximum loan size eligible for agency purchase 
programs was set directly by statute from 1970 through 1980.  Since 1980, the 
ceiling has been adjusted annually according to a formula incorporated in  1980 
legislation.  The adjustment  formula increases the limit at the beginning of 
each year by the percentage  change in the average purchase price for homes 
financed by  conventional mortgages as reported by  the FHLBB during  the 12—month 
period ending with the previous October.  Figure 1 illustrates how the maximum 
loan size limit  (and  that for ERA loans in high cost areas) has increased over 
time 
To  minimize the effect of regional factors, particularly differences  in 
expected default losses, we  decided to  choose a single state for our analysis. 
Given our need to  include numerous jumbo loans, California was the obvious 
choice.  To  test the hypothesis that the relation between yields  on conforming 
and jumbo loans has been  changed by  the expanded role of  the agencies in  the 
1980s, we chose two dates  for analysis:  1978, before  the agencies expanded 
their activities,  and 1986, by  which time the agencies seemed to dominate the 
conforming market.  Data for May,  June and July, peak  loan closing months, were 
analyzed for each year.  The volumes of loans closed  in these years was larger, 
many  times larger in some cases, than the volume in the intervening years. 
The basic loan sample was reduced in five ways.  First, adjustable  rate 
loans were deleted; our hypothesis  relates to  FRMs only (the agencies 
aecuritized less  than 5 percent of new  ARM originations in 1986).  Second, 
loans by  mortgage and commercial bankers were deleted.  Because only a handful —4— 
of loans originated by  mortgage bankers were included in the 1986 california 
sample, they had to be  deleted from both dates to  keep the data  comparable. 
commercial banks originated  such a small percentage of the loans in both years 
that we decided to  exclude these originations also.  Because no  mutual  savings 
banks exist (or were sampled) in california, savings and loans are the only 
originators for our sample.  Third, combination construction—purchase  loans 
were  excluded.  These were  only one percent of  the sample, and the contract 
rate here could easily be  mismeasured.  Fourth, loans with  loan—to—value ratios 
under 70 percent were excluded to make sure that no second mortgages or 
mortgages with significant seller—financing buy downs built into the price  )and 
thus the loan—to—value ratio) were included.  Fifth,  loans with  less than 25 
years term-to—maturity were  excluded for similar reasons.  Sixth, the 28  loans 
in 1986 that  had a base  rate below the coupon rate were deleted. 
The distributions of the 1978 and 1986 data samples, broken down by 
loan-to—value ratio and loan size )as a percentage of the conforming loan 
limit), are given in Tables 2 and 3.  Over seventy percent of the loans in our 
sample had 70 to 80 percent loan—to—value ratios  )over ninety—five percent of 
the 80 to 84.9 percent loans are 80  percent loans)  ,  and  about a fifth of all 
loans were jumbos.  In 1978, all the jumbos  had loan-to—value ratios under 85 
percent; in  1986, jumbos constituted  over a tenth of  loans with  loan—to—value 
ratios above 85 percent.  In  1978, fifty—nine percent of  the loans were less 
than 80 percent of the conforming limit and twenty—eight percent were between 
80 and 115 percent.  By  1986, these percentages had shifted to  forty—seven and 
thirty—nine, respectively. 
One additional point  about the data:  they are extremely  "noisy."  More 
specifically, the effective FRM rate at a given point in  time for loans at  or 
under the conforming  loan limit with similar loan—to—value ratios varies by  as 
much  as 4 to 5 percentage points!  To  illustrate, in June  1986, the 306 loans —5— 
closed with loan—to-value  ratios of  75 to 80  percent had effective loan rates 
ranging from 7.47 to 11.67 percent  (mean of 10.40, standard deviation of 0.45) 
For the 156 loans with  loan-to-value ratios of 85 to 90  percent, the range was 
an  even wider 8.71 to 13.97 percent  (mean of 10.60, standard deviation of 
0.67)  .  While  variation of up to 1½ percentage points  could conceivably  be 
rationalized  (and over 95 percent of  the loan rates fall within  this range( 
owing to differences  in the date the loan was originated and in loan size, the 
observed larger variation  implies significant reporting errors.1 
The apparent significant  reporting errora suggest three things.  Firat, a 
large data sample ia needed ao that the errors will not diatort the results; 
the significance  (and  plauaibility) of our estimates improved noticeably when 
we went from one to three months of  data in each year.2  Second, the data cells 
should be chosen carefully  to insure ample data pointa.  Third, our ability to 
'explain  the effective loan rate data will not be  great. 
II.  The Empirical Results 
Variationa  in effective  FRM yields on conventional loana originated in  a 
particular region of the country at a given point in time ahould be 
aysteaatically related to  two variables:  the aize of  the loan and the loan— 
to—value ratio.  The effective rate should decline with loan aize because the 
costs of  originating  and servicing contracts per dollar of loan decrease as the 
loan size increases.  The effective rate should riae, at an  increaaing rate, 
with the loan—to—value  ratio  (after it exceeds, say, 80  percent) because 
expected losses from  default increase.  (Effective rates on  equal—sized  loans 
collateralized by  equal—valued houses may vary across regions because the 
expected losses from  default may vary owing to differences in  expected houae 
price inflation/volatility  and/or in  state foreclosure laws.) —6— 
To test the hypothesis that  the loan  rate declines with  loan size, we 
have  computed the average effective rates on  loans of increasing size  (percent 
of  the conforming loan limit( for loans with  similar loan—to—value ratios  (75 
to 80  percent(  .  This also  provides a crude test  of the main hypothesis that 
the relationship between qualifying  and jumbo loan ratea changed between 1978 
and 1986. 
The data  in Table 4 provide support for both  hypotheses.  First, consider 
the declines in  effective rates for both 1978 and 1986 as  the loan size risea 
from under half the conforming limit to the limit.  Second, note the sharp rate 
jump at  the loan limit in  1986, in contrast to  the leveling off in  1978.  In 
fact, the 26 basis—point  jump for loans 91—100 percent of the limit to loans 
equal to  101—115 percent may understate the impact of the agencies' expansion. 
The 101-115 percent rate may be  lower in  1986 than it would be in  the absence 
of  the agency expansion because these loans would be  under the limit within a 
year (the  limit increased by  15 percent on  January 1, 1987( 
Table 4 also contains data on  the contract loan rate  and standard 
deviations of the effective and contract rates.  The contract rates follow 
roughly the same pattern as the effective rate.  The standard deviations are a 
little higher for smaller loans  (under  80 percent of the conforming limit( 
Somewhat aurprisingly, the standard deviations for the contract rata are 
slightly amaller than those for the effective rate; we  expected that accounting 
for points would reduce the dispersion in  contract rates. 
With this encouragement, we  have proceeded to a formal teat of the 
hypotheses by running OLS regressions, for 1978 and again for 1986, of  the 
form: 
r. = a  + a  June  +  a  July + a  lnL. + z b.LV.  + a  C. +  xc  0. + a  N. + c..  (1(  j  0  1  2  3  j  4  kkl  Sj  j —7— 
The independent variable is the effective loan rate, r,, for each of the 4,870 
loans closed in May—July 1978 and the 1,856 loans closed  in May—July  1986.  The 
principal co-variates are the natural log of  the real loan  size, L. (in 1978 
dollars), dummy variables,  LV,., for the three larger loan-to-value ranges 
hated  in  Table 2  (the 70 to  79.9 range is the standard against which the 
others are compared), and a dummy variable, C.,  for loans at or under the 
conforming loan limit.  other regressors include a constant term, dummies for 
the precise month the loan was closed  (June and July, May being the standard) 
dummies for the various geographic  subregions in California  (12  in 1978 and 13 
in 1986)  G, and a dummy  for loans on  new properties, N. .  Loans on  new 
properties have historically been  viewed as having less default risk than those 
on  existing properties  so we  would expect this dummy to  have a negative 
coefficient.  A negative coefficient  could also reflect preferred  financing 
rates  purchased" by  builders, where the cost of  the preferred rates is not 
captured in the survey.4 
The coefficient estimates and their standard errors are reported in Table 
5  for effective loan rates measured in percentage points.5  Three equations are 
listed for 1986; we begin by  comparing the 1978 equation with  the first 
equation for 1986.  The coefficients on loan size and the loan-to-value and 
new-property dummies are similar for the two years and,  except for the 80—84.9 
percent loan—to—value dummy,  are statistically different from zero with the 
expected signs.  The loan size coefficient translates into a —0.015 percent 
elasticity of  the interest rate with respect to the loan size.  Thus a 20 
percent increase in  loan size, say from the 1976 mean of $60,000 to $72,000, 
implies roughly s 3  basis point  decrease in loan rate.  The loan-to-value 
coefficients suggest little  extra charge for 80 to 85 percent loans relative to 
70-79 percent loans, but roughly a 10 basis point extra charge for 90  percent 
loans.  The average loan—to—value  ratios in the 85—89.9 and 90—95 percent —8— 
classes are quite  close  (89.4 versus 91.1 in  1978 and 89.0 versus 91.2 in 
1986) .  This  may explain the similarity of  the coefficients on  these two 
dummies.  Finally, the rate for new  properties is about 7 basis points less 
than  that  for existing properties. 
Now for the coefficients that changed from 1978 to 1986.  Of  course, the 
intercepts and June and July  dummy coefficients are different because the level 
and evolution of  mortgage rates in the spring of  the two years was different. 
Also different, though, is the coefficient on  the conforming  loan dummy.  The 
coefficient declines from —5 basis points in 1978 to —29 basis points in  1986. 
That  is, the expanded activities of the agencies seem to have lowered yields on 
conforming loans by 24  basis points relative to  yields on jumbo loans. 
The second equation for 1986 in  Table S tests a more sophisticated 
hypothesis:  agency activities lowered the rates on  jumbo loans just above the 
loan limit as well as  those on  loans below the loan limit.  Because the limit 
was raised by 15 percent on  January  1, 1987, only six to eight months after the 
loans were closed in May—July, a dummy variable was created for all loans 
between 100 and 115 percent of  the 1986 conforming  limit.  This range 
encompasses 27 percent of jumbo loans closed.  The addition of  the just—over— 
the—limit dummy has a negligible impact on  the coefficients for loan size and 
the loan—to-value and new—property dummies.  However,  the coefficient on  the 
just—over—the—limit dummy is statistically different from zero, and the 
coefficient on  the conforming  loan dummy increases by 7  basis points  in 
absolute value.  According  to these estimates, the expanded securitization of 
the agencies lowered the loan  rates on qualifying  loans by roughly  3S basis 
points and those on "soon to  be" qualifying loans by 20 basis points. 
This hypothesis csn be  refined even further.  While the loan limit 
increased by  15 percent on  January  1, 1987, this increase was not known when 
the loans closed in  May—July 1986 were originated.  Nonetheless,  such an —9— 
increase was highly likely because the index had risen at a 22  percent annual 
rate over  the first half  of  the adjustment period, October 1985 to  March 1986. 
On  the other hand, a loan—rate impact could well exist on  loans just above 115 
percent of  the conforming limit because a reasonable possibility  existed that 
these loans would fall under the limit in  1987 or  if not then in  1g88.  To 
allow for this further impact, a dummy for loans between 115 and 130 percent of 
the loan limit was added  (this  range includes another 20 percent of the jumbo 
loans.)  The third equation for 1986 does not indicate a significant  loan—rate 
impact for these loans. 
The effective loan rates shown in Table 4 and explained in Table 5 are 
likely measured with substantial error.  These rates were calculated  as 
r. = c.  + AOJ.,  (2) 
J  J  J 
where ADJ. = PT/PVAF1O.,  the ratio of  the up-front points and fees to the 
present value annuity factor using r. as the discount rate and a 10 year 
assumed mortqage life.  This  is an  incorrect adjustment for two reasons. 
First, the loans might be  expected to  prepay in more or  less than 10 years 
(probably less in  California)  6  Second, some of  the up-front charges just 
cover the costs of  origination  and thus do  not add to the yield.  A more 
appropriate adjustment would be: 
ADJ.* = (PT.  — COST  ./L.)/PVAFX.,  (3) 
3  3  33  3 
where COST, is the dollar  cost of  originating loan  and  is  the actual 
mortgage life expectation.  Unfortunately, neither 
COST 
nor  is observable. 
In our first experiment, we treat X 
as constant across loans and assume 
COST. to  be a constant.  Thus the adjusted effective rate, rt, can be expressed 
r=c. +aPT —a/L,  + r,  (4) 
j  j  lj  23  3 where l 
= 1/PVAFX,  a2 
= COST/PVAFX,  and  .  is  the remaining measurement  errnr. 
If,  for example, PVAFX = 5 and COST  = $500,  then a1 
= 0.2  and a2 
= $100.  In 
this framewnrk, lenders are assumed to offer households alternative 
combinations of  c.  and PT. for a given r'!,  and households  select their 
J  3  3 
preferred combination. 
A formal test of the hypotheses  consists of regressing r  on the various 
covariates  (loan—to-value ratio,  loan size, etc.) discussed above.  Because a1 
and a  are unknown, we instead regress c. on  PT., ilL.  ,  and  the  variables  2  3  3 
specified  in  equation  (1) .  Implausibly  large  (negative) values of 2  led us to 
reject this framework. 
As an  alternative, we  presume that lenders set points so  as to cover 
origination costs  (PT.  = COST./L.) 
.  In this case, c.  should be  regressed on 
the covariates of r  only.  These  results are reported in  Table 6.  The 
coefficients on  the loan—to-value and new-loan dummies change little from those 
in Table 5, but that on  loan size is  about halved and the conforming—loan dummy 
coefficients decline slightly.  Except for the latter, the coefficients are 
remarkable similar in 1978 and 1986.8  We note  that the R2  are roughly 10 
percent higher when  the coupon rates, rather than effective rates, are 
explained, and, more importantly, the equation standard errors are 15 to 20 
percent lower,  on these grounds we  prefer the estimates  in Table 6 to those in 
Table 5. 
By  these estimates, the agencies hays  lowered yields on  conforming  and 
just—above conforming loans by  30 and 15 basis points, respectively, relative 
to yields on large jumbo loans.  The 30 basis point spread between yields  on 
large—jumbo and conforming  loans is at  the low end of  the observed spread 
between yields on  private and agency pass-through securities  (Woodward, 1987) 
Thus, yields on large jumbo loens mey be being set by  the private securitizers, 
rather than by  traditional portfolio  lenders. —11— 
III.  Summary and Implicationa 
Our analysia of  conventional FRMa cloaed in California  in May-July of 
1978 and 1986 auggests that the loan rate depends on  the loan-to-value ratio, 
the loan  size, and in  1986, whether the loan is far above, just above, or  below 
the conforming  loan limit.  Loans with loan—to-value ratios of 90  percent have 
rates 10 basis points higher than loans with 80 percent ratios, and $60,000 
loans  (in  1986(  have rates 10 basis points higher than $130,000 loans. 
Moreover, in  1986 the rates on  loans far above the conforming loan limit exceed 
those on  otherwise comparable loans below the conforming loan limit by  30 basis 
points and those on  loans destined to  exceed the limit within a  year  by  15 
basis points.  That is, the expanded agency securitization of  conventional FRNs 
has significantly lowered the rates on  both conforming loans and loans somewhat 
above the conforming  limit  (27 percent of jumbo loans in  l986( relative to  what 
they would otherwise have been.  While the analysis was restricted to 
California,  this state accounted for roughly one-quarter  of the dollar volume 
of all conventional  FElls closed in  1986 and over half of all jumbos closed. 
Of interest is when  this conforming loan—rate impact first occurred.  The 
data in Table 1 suggest that the agencies' share of  the new origination market 
for conforming  FRMs did not exceed fifty percent until  1986, but conceivably 
the thirty—six percent share in 1985 was sufficient to  determine prices.  A 
brief examination of  rates on  loans closed in May-July 1985 suggests that this 
was not the case.  Yields  on conforming 75 to 80 percent loan—to-value loans 
exceeded those on  similar jumbo loans.  Thus 1986 seems to be  the first year of 
the agency impact on  FRN rates. 
The effects of a 30 basis point lower FRM rate are many, and some of them 
could be significant in  magnitude.  Households are more likely to choose FRMs 
than ARMs, to decide to  own rather than rent,  and to own larger houses. 
Traditional mortgage portfolio lenders will have fewer ARMs to purchase and —12— 
will earn lower returns on FRM investments.  We  conclude our paper with a few 
sample calculations to  illustrate the possible magnitudes of some of  these 
effects. 
Brueckner and Follain  (1988)  and Ohillon, Shilling and Sirmans  (1987) 
have  recently estimated equations explaining the household FRM/ARM decision. 
Using the Brueckner—Follain estimates, a 30 basis point decline in  the FRM 
rate, at spring 1986 interest rate levels, would have lowered the ARM share 
from  65  percent to 29  percent.9  In  the 1988 environment of a wider FRM—ARM 
rste spread  (assumed 50 basis—point  lower ARM rate)  ,  the  same FRN rate decrease 
would lower the ARM share from 95 to  75 percent.  Using the Ohillon—Shilling- 
Sirmans estimates gives  impacts about half as large.  These seem  more plausible 
to  us.  Thus we conclude that the lower FRM  rate induced by the agencies 
probably lowered the ARM share of  new originations in recent years by 10 to  20 
percentage points. 
A 30 basis point decline in the FRM rate would have a large negative 
long—run impact on  returns to  traditional FRM portfolio investors.  To 
illustrate, say that such  investors could expect to earn  a 15 percent pretax 
return, in the absence of the 30 basis point FRM rate decline, by  investing 96 
cents of  debt and 4 cents of equity in a  dollar of  mortgages.  A 30 basis point 
decline in the FRM rate would halve the expected return on  equity  (to below the 
return on  Treasuries)  .  Moreover,  the tilt in  households  toward FRMs would 
reduce the ARMs available for portfolio investment. 
Finally, a lower FRM rate would raise homeownership and the quantity  of 
housing demanded by owners.  This  impact is not large, however.  For example, 
if  the elasticity of  housing demand with respect to  the user  cost is negative 
unity, then housing demand  would  increase by less than 2 to 2½ percent.1° 
Because most price—elasticity  estimates are closer to  —0.5  (Mayo,  1981 and 
Goodman,  1988), the expected increase in demand is  closer  to one percent. —13— 
The above is not meant to be  either a full list of potential effects of a 
lower FRM rate or a full analysis of the effects considered.  For example, a 
relatively lower FRM rate likely means a higher level of other interest rates 
and thus  (slightly) less nonhousing capital.  The analysis should indicate, 
however, that a 30 basis point lower FR!.!  rate is  not a trivial matter. -14— 
Footnotes 
1.  For jumbo loans, more  variation  might be expected.  Borrowers  of such loans 
can be  highly desirable  customers  for whom  landers may lower the borrowing  rate 
in order to establish an  ongoing  relationship.  For example, the effective  rate 
on a jumbo loan  may be reduced depending on the size and number of  certificates 
of deposit placed  in the lender's  institution by  the borrower.  Further, 
without the agencies'  standardization  and the general discipline  of an active 
secondary market, underwriting  standards may vary significantly,  and some local 
oligopoly power may exist. 
2.  Initially some attempts were made to  "clean up" the data by deleting  loans 
with  interest rates that were "too low".  This did not significantly  alter  the 
empirical  estimates. 
3.  The 1978 survey also reported  the month the loan was originated.  Dummy 
variables  for the origination  month were  included in  the 1978 regression. 
4.  We thank Michael Carliner  for pointing out this possibility. 
5.  The coefficients  on the geographic  dummies are not listed.  The maximum 
difference  between the coefficients  was 16  basis points  for 1978 and 25 basis 
points  for 1986. 
6.  The ten—year assumption  is especially suspect in  periods when the term— 
structure is downward sloping  (much of 198D—82(  .  When  we  recomputed  the 
effective  loan  rate  based  on  an  assumed  seven—year  mortgage  life  and  used  this 
rate as  the dependent variable,  the coefficient  estimates were  virtually 
identical to those in  Table  5. —15— 
7.  when  points  are added to these equations,  the points  coefficient  is 
positive  (and significantly  different  from  zero in 1978)  ,  not  negative  as  might 
he expected. 
8.  If the agencies  dominate the market  and do not pay lower prices  for riskier 
high  loan—to—value  loans, then  one might  think loan rates would  not vary  with 
the loan—to—value  ratio.  However, originator/servicers  will still require a 
higher  coupon  (high price  from agencies) to offset  lower servicing value  owing 
to greater expected default. 
9.  These calculations  aaaume  a 10.60 percent FRM rate  (before the 30  basis 
point  decline),  an 8.15 percent ARM rate, a $40,000 income level, and the mean 
values of the other variables  in  the Brueckner—Follain  paper.  With these 
parameters,  the values  computed from  their equation  (2)  are 0.382 before  the 30 
basis point  decline and -0.563 afterwards.  Assuming  a standard normal  error 
term,  these values  translate  into the ARM  percentages  given  in the text. 
10.  Taking  the  "typical" owner to  be in  a 25 percent  tax bracket, a 30 basis 
point  lower FRM rate lowers the after—tax rate (and thus the user  cost) by 22 
basis points.  With  an  initial user  cost of 10 percent,  demand  rises by  2.2 
percent. —16— 
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Table  1:  The  Agency  Domination of the Conforming FRM  Market 
A.  Pasa-throughe  Issued  by  FHLMC and  FNMA  Cs  bil.) 
Pasa-Throughs Backed-By 
1  2  3  4=1—2—3 
Total  Seasoned  New ARMs,  Multia,  New 
Issues  FRM5  and  FNA/VA5  FRM5 
1977—81  4.6  0.6  4.0 
1982  38.2  28.8  9.4 
1983  33.0  17.1  1.8  14.1 
1984  32.2  17.7  3.7  10.8 
1985  62.3  25.5  5.1  31.7 
1986  160.1  29.7  10.7  119.7 
1987  138.2  24.4  18.4  95.4 
B.  Percentage of  New 1—4 Family Conventional  Originations Securitized 
5  6  75x6  8=4/7  9=8/0.75 
Total Origin—  Fraction  FRM Origin—  %  New FRMa  %  New Conformng 
ations )5bil)  Fixed Rate  ationa )Sbil)  Securitized  FRM5 Securitized 
1977—81  125.0  1.00  125.0  3  4 
1982  77.8  0.64  49.8  19  25 
1983  154.2  0.70  107.9  13  17 
1984  176.0  0.48  84.5  13  17 
1985  204.6  0.57  116.6  27  36 
1986  357.1  0.78  278.5  43  57 
1987  369.2  0.66  243.7  39  52 
Sources: 
Columns  1  and 5 from DataBase, Secondary Mortgage Markets, FHLMC. 
Column  2 except  1987, Diamond  )1988) 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effective Loan tes for California  with Loan-to-Valt. tios of 
75  and 80  Percent by  Loan Size, 1978 &ei 1986 
1978  1986 
Percent of  Effective  Coatract  Effective  Cmtract 
Cci,forming  &ither of  Loan  Rate*  Loan Pate*  of  p*  Loan Pate* 
Loan  Limit  ervatics  (in percent)  (in percent)  Ct,servati,s  (in percent)  (in percent) 
0.0-50.0  446  10.12  9.85  1(  10.65  10.30 
(0.27)  (0.2.3)  (0.44)  (0.34) 
50.1-67.0  736  10.04  9.80  179  10.53  10.23 
(0.24)  (0.21)  (0.41)  (0.) 
67.1—80.0  749  9.97  9.75  222  10.51  10.24 
(0.20)  (0.19)  (0.43)  (0.31) 
80.1-90.0  3  9.97  9.76  155  10.40  10.13 
(0.17)  (0.16)  (0.34)  (0.34) 
90.1-100.0  371  9.96  9.75  2C8  10.36  10.11 
(0.19)  (0.17)  (0.31)  (0.31) 
100.1—115.0  272  9.94  9.74  54  10.62  10.36 
(0.18)  (0.17)  (0.37)  (0.30) 
115.1-130.0  1  9.97  9.77  55  10.65  10. 
(0.18)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.31) 
130.1-145.0  131  9.95  9.76  46  10.70  10.44 
(0.22)  (0.18)  (0.36)  (0.33) 
Over  145.0  242  9.94  9.74  96  10.70  10.41 
(0.19)  (0.17)  (0.31)  (0.34) 
Overall Average 
Conforming  391  10.01  9.78  878  10.48  10.19 
(0.23)  (0.20)  (0.40)  (0.35) 
814  9.95  9.75  221  10.67  10.40 
(0.19)  (0.18)  (0.35)  (0.34) 
Source:  F1t88 no,thly survey. 
*  Standard deviations are reinted in parentheses. —22— 
Table  S 
Explanation  of California  FRM Effective  Loan Rates,  1978 and 1986* 
Equation** 
Independent  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  1978***  1986  1986  1986 
L  Log  of Loan Size in  1978 Dollars  -0.149  —0.177  -0.205  —0.214 
(0.011)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Lvi  Loan-to—Value  Categories: 
80.0%-84.9%  0.000  0.017  0.016  0.014 
(0.000)  (0.D25)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
85.0%-89.9%  0.101  0.089  0.092  0.092 
(0.014)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
90.0%  and over  0.127  0.119  0.124  0.124 
(0.011)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
C  Conforming  Loan Limit Duomly  —0.050  —0.294  -0.363  -0.389 
(0.011)  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.047) 
A  Just-Above  Conforming  Loan Limit: 
Dunriy  for 100 to 115% of  Conforming  —0.182  -0.204 
Loan Limit  in 1986  (0.054)  (0.058) 
Dummy  for 115 to 130% of  Conforming  —0.065 
Loan Limit  in 1986  (0.061) 
N  New Loan Dummy  -0.077  -0.057  —0.057  -0.054 
(0.008)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
a0  Intercept  11.607  12.512  12.891  13.021 
(0.129)  (0.432)  (0.445)  (0.459) 
ai  x June  0.093  0.225  0.226  0.225 
(0.016)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
a2 x  July  0.285  0.506  0.508  0.508 
(0.014)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Summary Statistics: 
N  4870  1828  1828  1828 
0.270  0.230  0.235  0.235 
SEE  0.047  0.183  0.182  0.182 
* Dependent  variable  is the effective  interest  rate for California  FRM5 with  terms to 
maturity  greater or  equal  to 25 years (measured  in percent). 
** Standard errors are reported  in  parentheses.  All equations  include a set of  duniny 
variables  for metropolitan  areas  (11 in 1978 and 12 in 1986). 
*** Also  includes a set of durimiy  variables  for the  month  the interest rate was 
determined.  This nnth  was  not requested  in the  1986 survey. —23— 
Table 6 
Explanation  of  California  FRH Contract  Loan Rates, 1978 and 1986* 
Equation** 
Independent  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  1978***  1986  1986  1986 
L  Log of Loan Size in 1978 Dollars  -0.092  -0.066  -0.087  -0.091 
(0.010)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
LV1  Loan—to—Value  Categories: 
80.0%-84.9%  0.004  0.010  0.009  0.008 
(0.006)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
85.0%—89.9%  0.107  0.071  0.073  0.073 
(0.012)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
90.0%  and  over  0.113  0.110  0.114  0.114 
(0.010)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
C  Conforming  Loan Limit Dumy  -0.032  -0.238  -0.288  -0.031 
(0.010)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.043) 
A  just-Above  Conforming  Loan Limit: 
Dumy for 100 to  115% of  Conforming  -0.133  -0.145 
Loan Limit  in 1986  (0.050)  (0.053) 
Dunmly  for 115 to 130% of  Conforming  -0.034 
Loan Limit  in 1986  (0.056) 
N  New  Loan DuImny  -0.080  -0.073  -0.073  -0.072 
(0.007)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
a0  Intercept  10.724  10.954  11.228  11.291 
(0.113)  (0.397)  (0.409)  (0.422) 
al x June  0.093  0.198  0.198  0.198 
(0.014)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
x July  0.293  0.511  0.513  0.513 
(0.012)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Sunmiary  Statistics: 
N  4870  1828  1828  1828 
R2  0.296  0.257  0.261  0.261 
SEE  0.036  0.155  0.154  0.154 
* Dependent  variable  is  the contract  interest  rate for California  FRM5 with terms to 
maturity  greater  or equal to 25 years (measured  in percent).  ** Standard  errors  are reportein parentheses.  All equations  include a set 
of dumy variables  for metropolitan  areas  (11 in 1978 and 12 in 1986).  *** Also  includes  a set of dunmly  variables  for the month  the interest  rate was 
determined.  This month was not requested  in the  1986 survey. 